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Abstract 
The 8(a) small business set-aside program is designed to support small business 
participation in the federal market and to foster small business growth. However, 8(a) 
graduates do not fare well over time, with more than 60% no longer receiving federal prime 
contract obligations less than 10 years after graduation from set-aside eligibility. Those who 
were still federal prime contractors gained very little additional government business, with 
the average contract obligation up only 3.3% to $6.25 million, from $6.05 million (showing a 
decline when adjusting for inflation). Additionally, 8(a) graduates still depended on set-
asides for more than half of their federal prime contract dollars. Overall, they are not 
rewarded for graduation. 
Introduction 
For decades, it has been the policy of the U.S. government to support and promote 
the growth of small businesses in the American economy. Part of that support comes from 
awarding government contracts to businesses that fall below certain size standards and are 
therefore eligible for special consideration. Constraining eligibility for contracts to certain 
businesses are sometimes called “set-aside” programs. One group of such set-aside 
programs is the 8(a) Business Development program under the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA). Under 8(a), the federal government limits competition for certain 
contracts to businesses that participate in the 8(a) Business Development program.1 
Qualified businesses that are certified to compete for 8(a) set-aside contracts do not 
retain that eligibility forever. Participating companies need to complete annual reviews to 
maintain good standing in the program, and a firm’s certification will last for a maximum of 
nine years. At the end of that period, companies may still compete for and win government 
contracts, but they will no longer be eligible for 8(a) set-aside contract awards, though in 
certain circumstances they may later regain eligibility.  
                                            
 
 
1 For more information about 8(a) requirements and eligibility, see https://www.sba.gov/federal-
contracting/contracting-assistance-programs/8a-business-development-program. 
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Through the SBA, the federal government tracks and reports on 8(a) set-aside 
contracts. What happens, however, to companies whose certification eligibility has ended? 
How successful are they in pursuing government contracts? Do they even stay in business? 
It appears that the SBA cannot answer these questions, because once a firm graduates 
from 8(a) eligibility, it’s not tracked and reported on. 
The Professional Services Council, under its Foundation, undertook an examination 
of these questions (illustrated in Figure 1). This paper describes the research question, the 
methodology, and the initial research results. It draws some preliminary conclusions and 
outlines further research needed. 
 
Figure 1. Research Background and Question 
The 8(a) Program allows disadvantaged businesses2 to compete for set-aside 
contracts, amongst other benefits. Firms may remain in the 8(a) program for up to nine 
years and may graduate from the program early in the case that they exceed size limits 
before the nine-year period of eligibility has expired.  
The expiration of 8(a) eligibility for a company is commonly referred to as 
“graduation.” From that point, previously certified firms may continue to pursue full and open 
competition for government contracts. This means they will need to be ready to compete 
with significantly larger and better resourced competitors. This study seeks to determine 
what happens to firms after they are no longer eligible to receive 8(a) set-asides.  
Research specific to the 8(a) Business Development Program and its outcomes is 
relatively limited. However, there is a body of research that more broadly explores the role of 
                                            
 
 
2 “Disadvantaged” is defined by Title 13, Part 124 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and 
focuses on socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. 
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set-asides in the government contracting industry both in the United States and 
internationally. 
A 2013 study by Jun Nakabayashi sought to estimate additional cost to government 
of procurement via set-asides for public construction projects in Japan. The study estimated 
that roughly 40% of small and medium contracting firms would fall out of the market if set-
asides were taken away. The study concluded, therefore, that procurement cost would likely 
increase as competition decreased (Nakabayashi, 2013). That conclusion may require 
further analysis and verification. 
Further, a 2011 comparison of small business contracting in the United States and in 
Europe found an increasing interest in fostering small business procurements in the 
European Union and some of its member countries (Kidalov, 2011). Small business set-
asides and other means of supporting the competitiveness of these firms may be an 
important component of a healthy federal contracting market. However, that success can be 
jeopardized if, after graduation, those firms have difficulty remaining competitive or even 
staying in business. 
 
Figure 2. Research Methodology 
For purposes of this study, we narrowed our focus to those firms that graduated from 
8(a) eligibility in 2009 and 2010. These two groups of firms will henceforth be referred to as 
“graduating classes,” designated by their year of graduation. 
We first identified firms of interest using the Dynamic Small Business Search 
(DSBS), furnished by the Small Business Administration. The search consisted only of 
previously 8(a) certified firms. The search did not include any firms with active 8(a) 
certifications. Due to the large number of firms that met this criterion, the DUNS numbers 
were gathered in groups of roughly five geographic states at a time. The resulting output 
from the DSBS included DUNS numbers and corresponding locations and 8(a) exit dates. 
After compiling a complete list of previously 8(a) certified DUNS numbers, all 
relevant contract data since FY08 were queried within a proprietary database of federal 
obligations data, originally extracted from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). To 
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ensure the fidelity of the data, we spot-checked a sample of the selected DUNS numbers 
against obligations data available at USASpending.gov.3 
We examined 10 fiscal years’ worth of data for DUNS numbers continuing to receive 
obligations (Figure 3). We then used FY17 as an end point to examine who was still in the 
market, who their customers are, and other characteristics of their interactions with the 
federal market.  
There are limitations when using obligations data provided by FPDS, with occasional 
errors and other inconsistencies within the data. Our work over the years with FPDS data 
shows, however, that such errors tend to be consistent over time and have little influence on 
long-term trends. Therefore, our analysis focuses on overarching trends within the data.  
 
Note. This figure shows total contract obligations in current dollars, to the 2009 and 2010 
graduates. 
Figure 3. Comparison of Total Obligations and Unique DUNS Counts 
One obvious metric for measuring the success of the 8(a) program is the number of 
firms remaining in the federal contracting market several years after their graduation from 
set-aside eligibility. There are, however, significant limitations to this approach. First, it is 
possible for a single firm to have more than one DUNS number, dependent on the services 
they provide and the customers they supply. It is also possible that a simple count of unique 
DUNS numbers will overestimate the number of firms participating in the market. Second, 
differences in spelling and format of vendor name entries in FPDS make it difficult to prevent 
overestimation using vendor names. Finally, there is nothing within FPDS data to indicate 
                                            
 
 
3 Because the data provided by USASpending are updated regularly, the obligations totals provided 
there and those provided by the proprietary database did not match exactly. However, the differences 
were minimal and deemed insignificant to the analysis. 
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why a DUNS number is no longer receiving prime contract obligations in later years. If a 
DUNS number is no longer receiving obligations after graduation, the firm may have failed 
and subsequently gone out of business, or it may have merged, been acquired, became 
only a subcontractor, or simply left the federal market. Further research will be required. 
However, a count of unique DUNS numbers may provide insight into broader 
outcomes of the 8(a) program. The 2009 graduating class included 418 unique DUNS 
numbers. Members of the 2009 graduating class received nearly $2.5 billion in prime 
contract obligations in FY09. By FY17, only 138 unique DUNS numbers from the class of 
2009 remained, representing a 67% decrease. In the same year, total obligations for this 
group had declined to $1.07 billion. Interestingly, this group experienced growth in total 
obligations over FY16, suggesting a potential rebound.  
The 2010 graduating class included 673 unique DUNS numbers. These firms 
received roughly $4.1 billion in prime contract obligations in FY10. By FY17, only 291 of 
those unique DUNS numbers received prime contract obligations. At 57%, the attrition rate 
was slightly lower than that of 2009 graduates. Total prime contract obligations for the group 
declined to $1.61 billion in FY17 and did not show similar signs of rebounding.  
There is a similar pattern in the decline in total prime contract obligations by class 
following graduation from 8(a) eligibility. For both graduating classes, the initial decline is 
steep, followed by a flattening out. Overall, only 39% of company-based DUNS numbers 
were still receiving prime contracts from the federal government in FY17. Contract 
obligations overall declined nearly as much, with FY17 totals being 41% of the funding in the 
year of graduation. In addition, the average size of contract obligations per DUNS number 
rose very little, from $6.05 million in graduation year to $6.25 million in FY17. Adjusted for 
inflation, the value of such obligations actually declined.  
 
Figure 4. Total Obligations: Department of Defense 
In examining the general decline of 8(a) graduates, it is important to note that this 
decline does not occur uniformly across graduating classes or contracting agencies. Figure 
4 shows trends within the Department of Defense (DoD). There are differences in how 8(a) 
- 231 - 
graduates have fared in working with each military department. The seven-year decline was 
relatively uniform for 2010 graduates, between 10% and 11% per year for each military 
department. For 2009 graduates, the largest decline occurred in contracts with the 
Department of the Army, with a compound annual growth rate of -14.12% over the seven-
year period from FY11 to FY17. Alternatively, the seven-year decline was less than 1% for 
contracts with the Department of the Air Force. Overall, 2009 graduates experienced a 
6.58% annual decline in obligations from the DoD between FY11 and FY17. 
Additionally, 2009 graduates experienced a significant rebound in prime contract 
obligations from FY15 to FY17, with the largest growth occurring in contracts with the 
Department of the Air Force at 15.49%. Contracts with the DoD grew 8.8% over the same 
period for 2009 graduates. The 2010 graduates did not experience the same rebound 
between FY15 and FY17, however it is possible that these firms may experience similar 
growth in FY18.  
 
Figure 5. Total Obligations Amongst Other Agencies 
Figure 5 shows declines contract obligations for 8(a) graduations from the 
Department of State, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Energy. 
There is no uniform trend across these agencies. 
For the Department of Energy, 2009 graduates experienced a seven-year decline of 
roughly 14%; they experienced 50% compound annual growth in the three-year period from 
FY15 to FY17. Prime contract obligations to 2010 graduates working with the Department of 
Energy were essentially flat from FY11 to FY17, however these firms experienced 23% in 
compound annual growth from FY15 to FY17. 
The Department of State showed a significant decline in prime contract obligations to 
2009 graduates over both the three-year and seven-year periods. However, though they 
experienced a decline from FY15 to FY17, contract obligations to 2010 graduates have 
remained flat at the Department of State over the seven-year period from FY11 to FY17.  
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Neither graduating class experienced growth in prime contract obligations with the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. The largest decline occurred for 2010 graduates between 
FY15 and FY17 at 31%. The 2009 graduates experienced a 24% decline over the same 
period.  
The number of 2009 and 2010 8(a) graduates receiving federal prime contract 
obligations receiving federal prime contract obligations declined more than 60% by 2017, 
and the total value of their contracts by nearly the same amount. However, to understand 
the viability of 8(a) graduates, it is also important to consider the sources of their contract 
dollars. Figure 6 shows those sources for 2009 graduates.  
 
Figure 6. Obligations by Set-Aside Type: Surviving 2009 Graduates 
The 2009 graduates received nearly 50% of their prime contract obligations from 8(a) 
program set-asides in their graduation year. It is also worth nothing, though, that roughly 
one-third of prime contract obligations for these firms came from full and open competition in 
FY09.  
By FY17, however, the percentage of obligations for 2009 graduates from full and 
open competition remained the same as in FY09, roughly one-third. The proportion of 
obligations from other set-asides, on the other hand, more than tripled compared to FY09, 
from 19% to 62%. In other words, many of these businesses depended on other set-aside 
programs. A majority of the funds obligated through other set-asides came from general 
small business set-asides.  
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Figure 7. Obligations by Set-Aside Type: Surviving 2010 Graduates 
In FY10, 44% of prime contract obligations for 2010 graduates came through 8(a) 
set-asides. This proportion is nearly identical to 2009 graduates in their graduation year. The 
2010 graduates also received a near identical proportion of obligations through full and open 
competition in FY10. They received a slightly larger proportion through other set-asides.  
Unlike 2009 graduates, however, by FY17 there was significant growth in the 
proportion of prime contract obligations awarded through full and open competition, from 
32% in FY10 to 51% in FY17. Contract obligations from other set-asides rose 50%, a far 
smaller increase than for 2009 graduates. 
Conclusion 
The 8(a) small business set-aside programs are designed to support small 
businesses and foster their growth. However, 8(a) graduates do not fare well over time, with 
more than 60% no longer receiving federal prime contract obligations. Those who were still 
federal prime contractors grew very little, with the average contract obligation up only 3.3% 
to $6.25 million from $6.05 million (if we adjusted for inflation, the average would show a 
decline). Finally, 8(a) graduates still depended on set-asides for more than half of their 
federal prime contract dollars. Overall, they are not rewarded for graduation. 
This suggests that, in general, even 8(a) graduates who are still receiving federal 
prime contracts are not growing. Further research is needed, particularly to identify which 
firms have grown and to determine the nature of that growth. Until then, it seems that 8(a) 
set-asides do not position graduates for growth.  
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